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Abstract: During Soeharto’s New Order, Muslim politics was 
virtually banned from any political activities in Indonesia. Yet, 
after the fall of Soeharto Muslims are free to speak, to establish a 
political party, and even to adopt Islam as their political ideology. 
The political climate has also considerably changed from an 
authoritarian to democratic system. In line with this 
democratization and liberalization, various Muslim groups with 
different approaches and agenda also emerge. It is not surprising 
that many Islamic radical groups have also emerged since that 
time. This paper endeavors to examine what caused the Muslim 
politics to greatly gain momentum in the post Soeharto period 
and whether it has a link to previous Islamic movement of 
parliamentary democracy in the 1950s. It shows that on the one 
hand the declining number of Islamic party voters indicates the 
weakening of “politik aliran” (ideology-based party) within 
moderate Islamic groups. However, another phenomenon 
emerges in form of the rise of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. 
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A. Introduction 
The relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia 
has long historical roots. It can be traced back to the late thirteenth 
century and early fourteenth century, when Islam was first 
disseminated in the country. The interaction between Islam and 
the local culture has developed well. They have become an 
inevitable issue in Indonesian political history. This intertwined 
history of Islam and politics has attracted a number of Indonesian 
researchers to investigate it, from the colonial period and 
independence to post independence, the New Order, and the 
Reformation era. 
This paper will explore the rise of Muslim politics in the 
Reformation era, including contemporary Islamic radicalism. In 
the first three years after the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia witnessed 
fundamental and democratic changes of   laws and regulations, 
                                                        
*The writer is the lecturer of Shari’a and Law Faculty of UIN (the State 
Islamic University) Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta.  
Ahmad Anfasul Marom 
 
 
Al-Qānūn, Vol. 13, No. 2, Desember 2010 
455 
including the most extensive decentralization process ever 
attempted. However, there were also many violent incidents, 
bombings, and inter-ethnic religious conflicts during this time. In 
Jakarta, numerous Chinese women were raped and hundreds 
were killed (many of them burnt alive in shopping centres that 
they appeared to be looting).1 Furthermore, violent and ethnic-
religious conflicts have occurred in several districts; for example 
the Muslim-Christian conflicts in the Moluccas (2000), the 
Christmas bombings (2000), Dayak-Madura conflicts in Sampit 
(2001), the Bali bombings (2002 and 2005), the vandalising of 
Ahmadiyah mosques in Cianjur, Majalengka and Lombok 
(2008),2 the FPI’s (the Front of Islam Defenders) attack on AKKBB 
(the National Alliance for Freedom of Faith and Religion) at 
Monas (2008), and numerous raids on bars, brothels and 
nightclubs under the banner of Islam in Jakarta. 
Since the end of Soeharto’s era the political landscape has 
changed considerably in Indonesia. Muslim politicians were 
banned from political activities in the New Order era. Nowadays, 
they are free to speak and establish a political party, and even 
adopt Islam as their political ideology. This political climate was a 
great opportunity for Muslim politicians to bring up topics 
related to the reinforcement of shari’a within the Indonesian legal 
system. With this context, three Islamic Parties, PPP, PBB, and PK, 
insisted on amending Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution by 
reinserting the seven famous words of the Jakarta Charter. They 
proposed it in two consecutive ST MPR, in 2001 and 2002, but 
their attempts were unsuccessful.3  
Historically, efforts to implement the Jakarta Charter had 
already failed three times before the Reformation era. This 
happened in the Council of BPUPKI-PPKI in 1945, the 
Konstituante Assembly in 1956-1959, and the General Session of 
MPRS (the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly) in 1966-
                                                        
1Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-
Soeharto Indonesia”, in South East Asia Research, 10 Pebruary 2002, p. 138. 
2Nurun Nisa’, “Tragedi Ahmadiyah Indonesia dari Bogor sampai Manis 
Lor”, in http://www.wahidinstitute.org, accessed 10 August 2008. 
3Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a and Constitutional Reform in Indonesia 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), p. 4. 
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1967. Nevertheless, the shari’a issue still remains a subject of 
debate nowadays. In the following section I will examine this 
issue by analysing the resurgence of Muslim politics after 
Soeharto’s resignation, including the Islamic political parties and 
radical Islamic groups.  
 
B. Muslim Politics in the Democratic Transition Period 
The ‘Muslim politics’ term refers to the symbolic and 
political movement of Muslim groups. Dale F. Eickelman and 
James Piscatori defined it as the competition and contest over 
both interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions that 
produce and sustain them.4 In other words, Muslim politics 
involves the mobilisation of widespread emotional commitment 
to Islam for political purposes, and it provides a powerful means 
for religious figures and politicians to gain the support of 
Muslims across numerous political and ethnic divides for their 
own particular interests.5 
The proponents of Muslim politics are inclined to use 
Islamic issues and symbolism in the public space at the expense 
of the religious minority. These issues are advocated not only by 
Muslim groups and Islamic institutions, parties and publishers, 
but also by regional bureaucrats and secular political parties, 
because the most important thing for politicians is how to win the 
support of Muslim voters. What happened in South Sulawesi is a 
good example: even though the central boards of Golkar, NU and 
Muhammadiyah have resolutely refused the enactment of 
regional shari’a regulation, their local board in South Sulawesi 
insists on supporting it.  
Following the resignation of Soeharto, after 32 years of 
presidency, the government reformed the power structures of the 
State and the electoral system. Two of the most important reforms 
                                                        
4D. F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 5. 
5Arskal Salim, “Muslim Politics in Indonesia’s Democratisation: The 
Religious Majority And The Rights of Minorities in The Post Soeharto”, in 
Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance, ed. Ross H. Mc Leod 
and Andrew MacIntyre (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), p. 117. 
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were the enactment of a new decentralization law and direct 
general elections. They have been implemented at both national 
and local levels. In addition, the reforms have opened the field for 
new arenas of political participation, new actors and power 
constellations, and new forms of political interaction.  
This meant an opportunity for Islamic groups to express 
their political interests. For more than half a century, Indonesia 
has not been able to conduct an uninterrupted dialogue 
concerning the position of shari’a in the existing political 
constellations. In 1945 and 1955, the efforts were hampered by 
Soekarno’s order. Under Soeharto, the issue was strictly banned 
as well. He worried that it would break government stability. 
Nowadays, Muslim politicians can freely articulate their 
political interests   through the constitutional mechanism. The 
new government has also given an opportunity for Indonesian 
people, including Muslim groups, to establish political parties. 
Whereas in the New Order era only three political parties were 
recognized, president B.J. Habibie allowed a multi party system. 
There were 48 political parties from all platforms taking part in 
the elections on 7 June 1999.6 
Ten of the 48 parties explicitly defined themselves as 
Islamic political parties, but it was only the PPP that received a 
significant percentage of the vote and ended up as the fourth 
most popular party with around eleven per cent. The PBB 
(Crescent and Star Party), which claimed to be the true successor 
of Masyumi, did not rise above two per cent, and the PK (Justice 
Party), which represented an ‘Islamist Campus,’ secured only 1.5 
per cent. The other Muslim parties were even less successful.7 
The two political parties that received most of the support 
from the Javanese Muslim communities (PKB, The National 
Awakening Party and PAN, National Mandate Party) did not 
declare themselves to be Islamic parties. These parties were led by 
prominent Muslim figures; Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais. 
The first primarily represents the traditionalist Muslims of 
                                                        
6Tim Litbang Kompas, Partai-Partai Politik Indonesia: Ideologi, Strategi, dan 
Program (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1999), p. xi-xii. 
7Martin van Bruinessen, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism, p. 141. 
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Central Java and East Java, while the latter represents the 
modernist Muslims and urban voters. They claimed to be 
nationalist rather than Islamic parties. Both tried to appeal to non-
Muslims as well as Muslim voters. However, because they also 
had to defend their core constituencies, this often placed them in 
ambivalent positions. 
It is important to note that the most significant parties in 
the 1999 elections were dominated by the nationalist and elite 
parties, PDI-P and Golkar, which had respectively collected the 
most votes. This shows that the popularity of Islamic political 
parties had not increased significantly during the general 
elections in this country. Compared to previous elections of 1955 
and 1971, votes for Islamic parties promoting the Jakarta Charter 
had instead decreased in 1999 and 2004. 
In the 1955 general elections, the supporters of the Jakarta 
Charter obtained 40 percent of the seats. In 1999, the proponents 
of the inclusion of shari’a into the 1945 Constitution won only 
twelve per cent, a decline of 28 percent.8  In the more recent 2004 
general elections, PPP won 8.05 per cent of the votes and PBB 
won only 2.62 percent of the ballots.9 This means that both parties 
together have 10.65 per cent, a slight decline from twelve percent 
in 1999. As a result, PBB was not permitted to compete in the 2009 
general elections because it did not fulfill the required electoral 
threshold of three percent.  
However, during the democratic transition the demand 
for shari’a implementation in Indonesia was still an interesting 
issue for a number of politicians and Muslim activists, apart from 
whether this political demand is realistic or not. In addition to the 
political openness factors discussed above, the resurgence of 
shari’a politics in modern Indonesia can also be examined from 
the Islamic political point of view. For Muslim fundamentalist, 
shari’a is believed to be the divine law that controls all Muslim 
behaviour and every aspect of life, including political activity. 
                                                        
8Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a and Constitutional Reform, p. 230. 
9Mitsuo Nakamura, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Observations on the 
2004 General Elections, Islamic Legal Studies Program Harvard Law School, 
occasional publications 6 December 2005, p. 13. 
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Some argue that the Islamist attitudes are indicatively 
shaped by private experiences; through parents, family, 
education, friends and literature. These are elements of the 
transmission process that strengthen the political culture and 
behaviour of Islamists. In the political arena, the Islamic parties 
calculatedly chose shari’a-issues and religious issues that were not 
in the political domains of large parties. Presumably, they 
realized that it was unrealistic to compete with and promote the 
same political issues as the large parties like PDI-P, Golkar, PKB 
and PAN, which preferred to promote the popular issues such as 
pluralism,  corruption, nationalism and economic development to 
gather votes. 
Therefore, the Jakarta Charter was considered a promising 
issue for Islamic parties, because it had been a crucial political 
topic in the 1950s. In short, it makes sense that they tried to use 
this emotional issue to gain support from the Muslim 
communities, because in the 1955 elections all the Islamic parties 
supported it. 
In the last fifty years, Muslim society in Indonesia has 
undergone a political polarization. According to Saiful Mujani, 
where in the 1950s santri groups were associated with the Islamic 
political parties, this no longer applies today, and similarly where 
in the 1950s the Muslim communities were relatively solid and 
supportive of the Jakarta Charter, now they are fragmented and 
some are not even interested in the formalization of the shari’a. 
Where in 1955 the opponents of the Islamic political parties were 
secular parties (PNI and PKI), today their rivals come from within 
the Muslim community.10 
This indicates that the politik aliran (political cleavages) has 
been vague. In 1962 Geertz classified modern Indonesian politics 
as two major cleavages, santri and abangan.11 The santri were 
associated with the Islamic political parties (Masyumi and PNU), 
while the abangan were inclined to articulate their political 
                                                        
10Saiful Mujani, “Syariat Islam Dalam Perdebatan”, in Syariat Islam: 
Pandangan Muslim Liberal, ed. Burhanuddin (Jakarta: JIL, 2003), p. 40-43. 
11Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 
203. 
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orientation within the nationalist or communist parties (PNI, 
PKI). Nowadays, the political ideology has evaporated, as shown 
by the PKB who explicitly disputed the implementation of the 
Jakarta Charter and shari’a regional regulations, whereas another 
national party, Golkar, supports the implementation of Shri’a 
Regional Regulation. 
 
C. The Failure of Islamic Political Parties  
The resurgence of Islamic political parties since 1999 is a 
distinctive feature of political freedom in Indonesia. During the 32 
years Islam was politically marginalized by the New Order, 
Muslim activists were strictly forbidden from expressing their 
political thoughts and actions. Therefore, it is only natural that 
many Islamic political parties reemerged and adopted Islam as 
their ideology, symbol and platform in the Reformation era. 
There are two characteristics of an Islamic party; the 
ideological basis and the background of its core voters. 
Ideologically, there are three outstanding parties which can be 
categorized as Islamic parties: PPP, PBB, and PKS. Although PKB 
and PAN are reluctant to be considered Islamic parties, their core 
supporters come mostly from the Muslim background, primarily 
from the NU and the Muhammadiyah community. This is why 
the Islamic parties always lose in every general election, since 
they have to compete within the same voter’s domain.  









The Ideological Cleavages of Major Indonesian Parties in the 1999 Election 
Adapted from Kevin Raymond Evans, Sejarah Pemilu & Partai Politik di Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: Arise Consultancies, 2003:34) 
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I have adapted the figure above from Kevin Raymond 
Evans’ finding which shows the position of each major political 
party as well as their ideological cleavages. Regarding the Islamic 
parties, it evidently indicates that most of their voters come from 
the same area, the Muslim community. Notwithstanding, they 
have similar agendas to some extent, such as discussed earlier 
about the PPP and the PBB which both struggled hard to reinsert 
the seven famous words of Jakarta Charter into the 1945 
constitution.12 Moreover, their efforts were strongly supported by 
radical Islamic groups, such as HTI (Indonesian Liberation Party) 
and MMI (Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters), which 
mobilized thousands of people in front of the Parliament 
Building.  
The emergence of formalist Islam has actually been 
predicted by William R. Liddle two years before the fall of 
Soeharto. He predicted that if the people would gain political 
freedom, then Muslim politics would proliferate rapidly in 
Indonesia, because the Muslim communities have many political 
resources such as social organizations, media, and access to 
political elites.13 W. R. Liddle’s hypothesis turned out to be true. 
Since the reformation era, Islamic radicalism mushroomed all 
over the country. Before getting into this, I will briefly portray the 
resurgence of the Jakarta Charter and Islamic political parties.  
The Jakarta Charter has been a political topic in Muslim 
politics since the very beginning. Some Muslim leaders felt 
betrayed when the Jakarta Charter (22 June 1945), which had been 
formulated through an agreement between nine members of 
BPUPKI (the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian 
Independence), was altered on 18 August 1945. Some observers 
saw this as the beginning of the loss of Islam in the early national 
                                                        
12Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, “Introduction: The State and Shari’a 
in the Perspective of Indonesian Legal Politics”, Shari’a and Politics in Modern 
Indonesia, ed. Arskal Salim and Ayzumardi Azra (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p. 1. 
13William R. Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One form of Islamic 
Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia”, in Toward a New 
Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian Islamic Thought, ed. Mark R. 
Woodward (Arizona: Arizona State University, 1996), p. 325-356. 
Islam and Politics: The Rise of Muslim Politics ...  
 
 
Al-Qānūn, Vol. 13, No. 2, Desember 2010 
462
politics. 
This debate continued in the Konstituante Assembly on 31 
May and 1 June 1959, that was meant to replace the 1950 UUDS 
(Provisional Constitution). Because the parliament assembly 
faced a deadlock, Soekarno issued a decree to return to the UUD 
1945 and to dissolve the Konstituante on 5 July 1959.14 In the early 
New Order period, Islamic parties struggled for the restoration of 
the Jakarta Charter in the constitution. Unfortunately, their 
demand faced another deadlock, because the military did not 
allow the issue to be discussed during the MPR assembly of 
1966/1967. The political tension between Islam and the state 
heated up again. At that time Muslim politicians were 
marginalized and severely repressed by the military. No political 
parties dared to talk about the Jakarta Charter. 
However, by the end of the 1980s, the political 
circumstances had undergone a transformation. The relationship 
between Islam and the State was no longer antagonistic. 
Although the New Order restricted the discussion of shari’a topics 
in the parliament, they presented a more accommodative stance 
towards social, cultural, and Islamic community interests. This 
political change was caused by the attitude of cultural Muslim 
movements which accepted the Pancasila as their basic ideology. 
According to Greg Barton, the political accommodation of the 
New Order towards Islam had something to do with the roles of 
neo-modernist figures such as Gus Dur, Nurcholis Madjid, 
Djohan Efendi and Ahmad Wahib. 
In the Reformation era, Muslim politicians gained much 
more freedom to express their aspirations, but they polarized in 
various groups as had occurred in the 1955 elections. It is worth 
mentioning that in the 1955 elections two santri political parties, 
Masyumi and NU, representing forty percent of the votes, 
favored replacing Pancasila with Islam as the foundation of the 
Indonesian state. The first of these parties represented the 
modernist group (Muhammadiyah), whereas the latter 
represented the traditionalists (NU).  
                                                        
14Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a and Constitutional Reform, p. 65. 
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Nevertheless, after the Reformation era, both the 
Muhamadiyah and the NU resolutely rejected the formalization 
of the shari’a. They canalized their aspirations through PAN and 
PKB respectively.15 Interestingly, at the same time, there were 
other parties with the same constituent bases, PBB among the 
modernists and PPP among the traditionalists, who both 
supported the restoration of the Jakarta Charter in the 
constitution. Regarding this issue, the Muslim politicians have 
distinctive political views about the Jakarta Charter among 
themselves; some even contradictory, yet only PPP and PBB 
proposed reviving the Jakarta Charter which was once a part of 
the draft constitution at the beginning of the Republic.  
The PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), which during the 
1999 and 2004 elections did not campaign about Islamic issues, 
participated to support the revival of the Jakarta Charter in the 
2001 Annual Session of MPR. PKS declared their political 
platform as a partai dakwah (missionary party) and claimed that 
they are not an Islamic fundamentalist party.16 This party did not 
have preexisting political roots such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and 
nationalist groups. This is why they tried to gain the public’s 
attention by using K.H. Hasyim Asyari, K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, and 
even Soekarno as part of their political campaign for the 2009 
elections.  
In addition to the Islamic parties, the rise of Muslim 
hardliners was also remarkable in the post-Soeharto. Although 
they have different concerns, strategies and goals, they share the 
view that the shari’a should be implemented in Indonesia. Their 
prominent slogan is ‘save Indonesia with shari’a.’ The following 
section will discuss the rise of Islamic movements in Indonesia.  
 
D. The Emergence of Radical Islamic Movements  
Since the end of Soeharto’s regime, Islamic radicalism has 
                                                        
15See Greg Barton, Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia: Pemikiran Neo-
modernisme Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib dan Abdurrahman 
Wahid, 1968-1980 (Jakarta: Paramadina; 1999), p. 94. 
16Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis 
Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer (Bandung: Teraju, 2004), p. 182. 
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become very visible. Indonesian Muslims which were known as a 
smiling people suddenly changed into hating, intolerant, and 
violent people. Jiha>d and shari’a became prominent terms in 
Muslim public discourse. On 2 April 2000, thousands of people 
gathered at the Senayan Stadium, Jakarta, to attend a Tablig Akbar 
(a mass religious rally). This rally was meant to respond to the 
religious conflict which occurred in Maluku. All of the people 
wore white garbs, and some of them brought swords. Panglima 
Laskar Jihad, Ustad Ja’far Umar Thalib declared the 1421 H 
(Islamic year) as the year of jiha>d.17 
Seven years later, on 12 August 2007, approximately one 
hundred thousand people returned to gather at the Gelora Bung 
Karno Senayan stadium, Jakarta, to attend an international 
khila>fah conference that was held by HTI. The theme of the 
conference was ‘It is time for the Khali>fah (caliph) to lead the 
world.’ The participants of the conference loudly called for the 
implementation of Islamic shari’a and asked the Indonesian 
government to bring an end to secularism, because they 
considered it the root of the nation’s problems. 
Moreover, numerous incidents of violence under the 
banner of religion also occurred after the demise of Soeharto, such 
as Laskar Jihad versus Laskar Kristus in the Moluccas (2000), the 
Christmas bombings (2000), Poso conflict (1998-2003), the Bali 
bombings (2002 and 2005), the vandalism of the Ahmadiyah sect 
(2008),18 and numerous raids on bars, casinos, brothels and 
nightclubs that are often conducted by the FPI in Jakarta. 
Concerning the Ahmadiyah case, on 14 February 2008 
three radical Islamic groups (FPI, MMI, FUI) gathered in a 
pengajian (religious ceremony) in Banjar, West Java. They 
insistently demanded the implementation of the shari’a and the 
dissolution of the Ahmadiyah sect. In his speech, Ahmad Sobri 
Lubis (an FPI preacher) made several provoking remarks under 
the banner of Islam to expel Ahmadiyah members from 
Indonesia, and in front of thousands of Muslim people he 
                                                        
17-, “Enam Wakil Laskar Jihad Bertemu Presiden”, in Kompas, 7 April 2000, 
http://www2.kompas.com, accessed 1 November 2008. 
18Nurun Nisa’, Tragedi Ahmadiyah Indonesia. 
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provocatively shouted “bunuh, bunuh, bunuh…” (kill, kill, kill…) 
added to continuously yelling “Alla>h al-Akbar” (the Mighty of 
God).19 
William Liddle, a political analyst, evaluated that since the 
2004 elections, the demands of the conservative Islamic group 
have become a larger part of public debates. In fact, his analysis is 
correct as there have been numerous shari’a issues that have been 
managed by the central and local governments, such as the MUI’s 
fatwas - the prohibition of pluralism, liberalism, and secularism, 
the ban of the Ahmadiyah sects, and the implementation of 
SRRs.20 
Before further discussing the factors that affected the 
spread of the Islamic radicalism, it is important to define 
radicalism here. Literally ‘radicals’ means tending or disposed to 
make extreme changes in existing views, habits, conditions, or 
institutions. Borrowing Harun Nasution’s words, this means a 
conservative movement that often uses violent acts in achieving 
their political target and transmitting their faith.21 In the Islamic 
context, this term is often used for the hardliner groups that use 
violence under the banner of Islam. 
  
E. Factors Driving the Spread of Radical Islamism 
The unstable politics of the ‘Reformation euphoria’ have 
contributed to the growth of the radical Islamic movements in 
Indonesia. In this section I will describe the cause of the increase 
in the number of organizations, divided into two kinds of factors. 
The first are the domestic political crises such as the economic 
crisis, national leadership, and the lack of law enforcement, 
whereas the second mostly includes global issues like religious 
sentiment, transnational network, and identity crisis. Both factors 
                                                        
19The video record of the incitement prophecy can be seen at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U7RLCXNdKF4, accessed 8 November  2008. 
20The fatwa concerning pluralism, secularism and liberalism was released 
by MUI (the Indonesian Ulama Council) together with the fatwa banning 
Ahmadiyah sect on 28 Jul. 2005. See: “Tapal Batas Tafsir Bebas”, Gatra, 6 August 
2005, p. 75-79. 
21See: Harun Nasution, Islam Rasional (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), p. 124. 
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1. Internal Factors 
Firstly, During the last few months of the fall of Soeharto 
in 1997, Indonesia faced a serious economic crisis. Many people 
lost their jobs and suffered from poverty. This is why some 
people, especially the young generation, who had difficulties 
finding jobs, were easily persuaded to join the radical Islamic 
movements. These movements not only channeled their protest 
about the economical problems that they were facing, but also 
used religious justification to blame the government policies and 
other groups. For example, FPI members, mostly unemployed 
young people, were interested in becoming jihadists.22 
The second factor was the weakness of the national 
leadership. Three civilian presidents were facing serious 
difficulties in creating socio-political stability after the collapse of 
Soeharto’s authoritarian reign. Under Habibie’s presidency, press 
freedom and civil rights were increasing. However, the MPR 
rejected his accountability report at the Sidang Istimewa (SI, Special 
Session) on October 1999 and did not reelect him. He was 
considered a failure in establishing good governance and 
controlling the corrupt bureaucracy which was the legacy of 
Soeharto’s reign. The political circumstances changed when 
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) became president in 1999. 
Indonesian people had high expectations of him since he was 
considered to be the first democratically elected president. 
Likewise, he has been widely known as a charismatic figure, a 
moderate Muslim, and a pro-democracy activist in Indonesia. 
However, his controversial statements often triggered 
controversies and misunderstandings among people, such as 
revoking TAP MPR no. 25 about Marxism, Leninism, and 
Communism restrictions and the dissolution of Departemen 
Penerangan (the Information Department). Consequently, he was 
                                                        
22Robert W. Hefner, “Globalization, Governance, and the Crisis of 
Indonesia Islam”, paper presented for Conference on Globalization, State 
Capacity, and Muslim Self Determination, University of California Santa Cruz, 7-9 
March 2002, p. 14. 
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impeached by the parliament in the middle of his term. 
On 24 July 2001 Megawati took over the presidency and 
became the first female president of Indonesia. In the beginning 
Megawati was able to create political stability, but her silent 
attitude and capability to apply better law enforcement raised 
many questions, until finally the first Bali Bombing challenged 
her leadership. Under the Megawati presidency the KKN 
practices (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) were still 
thriving.23 
Third, the lack of law enforcement was also a significant 
factor in the rise of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. The absence 
of a state structure and uncertain political conditions hindered the 
law enforcement process. Corruption was still rampant, deeply 
rooted in several aspects of the state bureaucracy, the business 
sectors, and the poor judicial system. Even the government 
indirectly protected the suspected corruptors for political 
purposes, such as in the case of the misuse of BLBI (Bank 
Indonesia Liquidity Support) funds.24 These kinds of 
circumstances provided an opportunity for the Islamists to 
promote the adoption of shari’a Islam as an ‘alternative law’ in 
Indonesia. In short, they argued that the secular law system 
caused the unstable conditions and multi dimensional crisis in the 
country. 
  
2. External Factors 
The first factor is religious sentiment provoked by certain 
situations in Islamic countries. The world witnessed the injustice 
of George W. Bush’s pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and his 
attempts overthrow the Taliban regime led by Mullah 
                                                        
23M. Syafi’i Anwar, Shari’a, Pluralism and the Prospect of Democracy in Post 
Soeharto Indonesia, paper presented at EU-Indonesia Day conference on 
Pluralism and Democracy: Indonesian Perspective, organized by the European 
Commission in collaboration with European Institute for Asian Studies’, 
Brussels Charlemagne Building, 7 December 2006, p. 14. 
24BLBI scandal revolves around Rp. 144.7 trillion (US$12.3 billion) in state 
money expend to 48 banks during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. See: -, 
“KPK Could Give up Probe into Huge Bank Scandal’, in Jakarta Post, 18 
November 2008. 
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Mohammad Omar. Another situation occurred in Iraq, when 
Bush’s accusation and subsequent invasion on the pretext of 
Saddam Hussein owning weapons of mass destruction caused 
the people of Iraq to suffer in war. In fact, after Saddam Hussein 
was captured and sentenced to death, the existence of the 
frightening weapons has never been proven. 
The radical Islamic groups convinced the people that 
George W. Bush’s policy was part of a conspiration to destroy 
Islam. They used this global issue to strengthen their anti-
American political agenda, with issues such as the 
implementation of the shari’a. In addition, the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan also influenced the Islamic political landscape in 
Indonesia. The protest against the invasion of Afghanistan 
worsened the diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and the 
United States. It ignited the radical Islamic groups in this country; 
they were planning to forcefully expel U.S. citizens from 
Indonesia with a ‘sweeping’ operation. Their actions scared the 
international people, particularly Americans and other 
Westerners. Over 1.3 million tourists cancelled their trips to Bali 
and other destinations in Indonesia from 11 September 2001 until 
the middle of October.25 Since that time Islamic radicalism in 
Indonesia has become much more visible. 
The second factor is the existence of transnational 
networks. After the attacks on the WTC in New York (11 
September 2001), international concern was focused on radical 
Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The ICG 
(International Crisis Group) reported that the incidents of 
religious violence in Indonesia might be associated with 
international terrorist cells in Afghanistan, because several 
hundreds of Indonesian Muslims were involved in the Islamic 
fighting against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan in 
the 1980s. According to military intelligence resources there were 
around eight hundred Indonesian Muslims that had joined the 
                                                        
25Cees van Dijk, The Hearts and the Minds of the People: Southeast Asia After 
11 September 2001, paper presented in International Seminar, Islamic Militant 
Movements in Southeast Asia, 22-33 Jul. 2003 in Jakarta (Indonesia-Netherlands 
cooperation in Islamic Studies INIS-Leiden), p. 30. 
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jihad in Afghanistan in 1980s. 
Except for the al-Qaeda link, Salafism and Wahabism has 
also undeniably played a role in increasing Islamic radicalism in 
Indonesia. Two prominent figures of hardliner groups, Ja’far 
Umar Thalib and Habib Rizieq Syihab, are known to have a close 
connection with the Wahabist and Salafist networks in the Middle 
East. They have spent many years studying in Saudi Arabia with 
conservative ulama. Therefore, it is not surprising that they teach 
the Wahabist doctrine, jihad, and adopt Arabic symbols in 
Indonesia such as using turbans, long garbs, and growing 
beards.26  
The third factor is the identity crisis. Globalization has 
increased the dependency of Muslim countries in economics, 
politics, and technology. Aware of this, they cautiously encounter 
the ‘global impact’ by expressing their own cultural identity. 
Most Indonesian Muslims realize that globalization has entered 
their daily life, whether it is negative or positive, but they are 
convinced that globalization is a product of Western civilization 
which should be treated carefully. Furthermore, the Islamist 
groups argue that Western products are not ‘value free.’ They 
contain an ideological, political, and cultural hegemony that 
threatens the existing moral, religious, and cultural values.27 
According to Islamist groups, Indonesian Muslim society 
has become ‘more permissive’ nowadays. They claim that has 
been increasing tremendously both in print and electronic media 
since the Reformation era. The decadence of morality is often 
used by Islamist groups to support their anti-America campaign. 
They promote the idea of ‘back to our Islamic identity’ by 
establishing shari’a laws and Islamic symbols. Generally, they call 
for returning the Islamic glory of the past when responding to the 
globalization process. This reaction demonstrates the existence of 
an identity crisis with an inability to resist the tide of 
globalization. Ironically, their actions lean towards violence and 
                                                        
26For a comprehensive explanation see Noorhadi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: 
Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (NY: SEAP 
Cornell University, 2006), p. 63-91. 
27Ahmad Shboul, “Islam and Globalization”, in Islam Perspective on the New 
Millineum, ed. Virginia Hooker (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), p. 56. 
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anarchy, which can hinder their own position in opposing 
Western culture. 
 
F. The Profile of Radical Islamic Organizations 
This section will discuss the historical background of 
Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. Not all militant Islamic groups 
have a link to the former Darul Islam (DI) movement. Some of 
them were established in the post-Soeharto era, such as Laskar 
Jihad and the FPI. However, there are also new organizations that 
still have a link to the past underground Islamist movement Darul 
Islam. Although this organization was exterminated entirely in 
the 1960s, many of its members remained active and are linked to 
modern groups, most prominently to the MMI.  
To some extent, these groups share the same goal but 
have different methods for achieving their political agendas, for 
instance the implementation of shari’a laws, purification of Islamic 
teachings, anti-America campaign, anti-secularism,-pluralism, 
and -liberalism. Here, the radical Islamic groups are divided into 
two categories; conservative radicalism and the neo-conservative 
groups. The first time are the radical Islamic organizations that 
operated under the past regime, or current groups that have a 
link to the former; ‘New face-Old vision.’ The second are the 
groups that have been established in the post-Soeharto era, and 
probably do not have any structural links with the former radical 
Islamic movement. 
 
1. Conservative Radical Groups 
The DI (Darul Islam) movement was founded in 1948, and 
led by Soekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo. Literally, this term 
means ‘Home’ or the territory of Islam where the Islamic faith 
and Islamic regulations must be obeyed. Its opposite is Darul Harb 
which means ‘the territory of war, the world of infidels.’28 The DI 
movement first started in the mountainous region of West Java, 
and was then extended to South Kalimantan (1950), South 
                                                        
28Cees Van Dijk, Rebellion Under The Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in 
Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 10. 
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Sulawesi (1952), and Aceh (1953).29 
On 7 August 1949, Kartosoewirjo formally proclaimed the 
Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) in Cisampang, West Java.30 
Although religion was not really the main reason for establishing 
this organization, Islam was the factor glueing the leaders 
together. All agreed that the state should be based on the shari’a; 
therefore they agreed to establish the United Front of the NII in 
1953. This insurrection movement was divided into seven local 
commandos (KW) that were led initially by Kartosoewirjo. Later, 
in the mid 1970s, the regions were expanded with two locations, 
KW 8 in Lampung and KW 9 in Jakarta and its surroundings.31 
Formally, this movement had a constitution called Qanun Asasi.  
The constitution of the NII closely resembled the 1945 
Constitution. After proclamation of the NII, the rebellion 
movement under the name DI rapidly proliferated in several 
districts of Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and 
Aceh. However, after around thirteen years (1948-1962) the 
insurrection of the DI was successfully terminated by the national 
military and the main leaders were killed or arrested. 
Kartosoewirjo was sentenced to death by the Military Court in 
1962, and Kahar Muzakkar’s was shot dead by Kujang Battalion 
troops of the TNI (Indonesian National Military) in 1965. 
However, not all their members were captured; many of them 
have persisted in underground movements until the present. 
Lately, the radical Islamic groups such as Komando Jihad and the 
MMI struggling for the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia are 
said to have structural links to the former Darul Islam. 
Komando Jihad, in the 1970s and early 1980s there were 
repeated eruptions of Islamic terrorism - arson, bombing of 
churches, night clubs, and cinemas - which were attributed to the 
Komando Jihad.32 Based on government information, this 
organization rejected Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Its 
                                                        
29ICG, “Daur Ulang Militan di Indonesia: Darul Islam dan Bom Kedutaan 
Australia”, Brussels: Crisis Group Asia Report no 92, 22 February 2005, p. 2. 
30Taufik Adnan Amal and Samsu Rizal Panggabean, Politik Syari’at Islam: 
dari Indonesia hingga Nigeria (Jakarta: Pustaka Alvabet, 2004), p. 65. 
31ICG, Daur Ulang Militan di Indonesia, p. 2. 
32Martin van Bruinessen, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism, p. 128. 
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long-term aim was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, 
while the short-time objective was destroying communism. 
However, the ICG reports that it was merely a creation of 
Ali Moertopo and BAKIN (State Intelligence Coordinating 
Agency) to dissuade people from voting for the one remaining 
Muslim party, PPP, in the 1977 elections. After a number of the 
former DI leaders responded to Murtopo’s idea, in the middle of 
1977 the state apparatus had 185 people arrested who were 
engaged in Komando Jihad. They were accused of continuing 
Kartosoewirjo’s idea of establishing the NII. The arrested leaders 
of Komando Jihad were Haji Ismail Pranoto and Haji Danu 
Mohammad Hasan; both were Kartosoewirjo’s close accomplices. 
In 1983 Haji Danu admitted in front of the court that he was 
recruited by members of BAKIN.33 
Komando Jihad later referred to other names, Asep 
Warman alias Musa Warman. He became a key informant of the 
Komando Jihad in the Palembang and Lampung territories. He was 
also involved in the DI movement and remained a useful 
scarecrow until the mid-1980s.34 Starting in January 1979, 
Warman joined forces with Abdullah Umar, a teacher of Ngruki 
pesantren, and conducted a series of violent acts that became 
known as ‘Terror Warman.’ Their first action was killing the 
rector of Universitas Sebelas Maret, in Solo.35 According to a court 
document, the victim was killed because he gave information to 
the government about the existence of the Jaringan Islamiyyah (JI), 
which caused the arrest of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar 
Baasyir.36 
On 1 March 1979, Warman’s group succeeded in robbing 
a car that was transporting the salaries of employees of the IAIN 
(State Islamic Religious Institute) in Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta. 
A few weeks later, they attempted a second robbery by blocking a 
                                                        
33Taufik Adnan Amal, Politik Syari’at Islam, p. 68. 
34Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-
Islam Relations in Indonesia”, in Indonesien am Ende des 20, ed. Ingrid Wessel 
(Jahrunderts-Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996), p. 26-27. 
35Taufik Adnan Amal, Politik Syari’at Islam, p. 69. 
36See further account in ICG, Daur Ulang Militan di Indonesia, p. 8-9. 
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car that transported the salaries of the employees of the IKIP in 
Malang, East Java, but they failed.37 This robbery was based on 
the Islamic concept of fa’i, raising funds by attacking enemies of 
Islam. After looking at Warman’s team’s operation, the 
underground DI leaders recruited them for the DI structure. 
However, by the end of 1980, Komando Jihad was successfully 
destroyed by the security apparatus. Warman himself was shot 
dead by the TNI on 23 July 1981 in Soreang Kolot, Bandung.38  
The MMI (the Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters), 
although it was established just after the fall of Soeharto, most 
leaders were involved in the former radical Islamic groups (DI, 
DDII, and JI) under the previous Indonesian regime. This 
organization was formed based on the result of the 1st Mujahidin 
congress on 7 August 2000 in Yogyakarta. The Congress 
produced a ‘Yogyakarta Charter’ and a number of 
recommendations.39 The results of that congress were submitted 
to the Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (FPP, United 
Development Fraction) preceding the ST MPR 2000. 
The first MMI congress was attended by around 1.500 
people; some of them were veterans of the Afghanistan War, 
religious leaders who supported the adoption of shari’a laws in 
Indonesia, and former members of the DI movement. The 
congress elected Abu Bakar Ba’asyir from the pesantren al-
Mukmin Ngruki as the amir al-Mujahidin (supreme leader of the 
movement). He was allegedly connected with the DI, Komando 
Jihad, and the Usroh movement. 
In 1978 Ba’asyir was sent to prison for four years because 
of his harsh criticism of Soeharto’s policies, and he was accused of 
rebelling against the government for his da’wah (sermon) about 
establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. After being released 
from prison in 1982 he did not stop criticizing the government. 
Specifically when Soeharto imposed the Pancasila as the sole 
                                                        
37ICG, “al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the Case of the Ngruki Network”, in 
Indonesia, ICG Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002, p. 8. 
38-, “Akhir Perburuan di Soreang”, in Tempo, 1 August 1981. 
39The proceedings of the 1st conference and Yogyakarta Charter can be 
found in Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakkan 
Syari’ah Islam (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001). 
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basis ideology of all organizations in the mid 1980s, he rejected 
this policy. Because he was aware that he would be jailed for a 
second time, he decided to flee and went to live in Malaysia. 
Ba’asyir spent a decade and a half in exile in this state; he built a 
network of contacts among committed Muslims in Malaysia, 
Singapore, and the Philippines, occasionally referred to as Jamaah 
Islamiyyah (JI). The Malaysian and Singaporean police authorities 
saw Ba’asyir as the suspected al-Qaeda commander responsible 
for terrorist violence in Southeast Asia. 40 
However, Ba’asyir denied this. He argued that JI is a 
Western fabrication used to stigmatism Muslims. After Soeharto’s 
resignation in 1998, he returned to Indonesia in October 1999. 
When the 2002 ST MPR failed to reinsert the seven words of the 
Jakarta Charter into the constitution, Ba’asyir and his groups 
pressured the MUI to immediately issue a fatwa about which 
political parties should be supported by Muslims in the 2004 
elections.41 
 
2. Neo-conservative Groups 
The FKAWJ (Communication Forum of Ahlus Sunnah wal-
Jama’ah) was established by Ja’far Umar Thalib on 14 February 
1998 at the Manahan stadium in Solo, Central Java.42 The main 
purpose of this group was essentially to purify or return to the 
original Islam. In this regard, the group was ideologically 
influenced by the Wahhabi Salafism teachings of Arab preacher 
Muhammad Abdul Wahhab in the 18th century.43 
As Robert W. Hefner called it: 
A neo-fundamentalist or neo-salafy, because it emphasizes 
extreme political views not associated with earlier variants of 
                                                        
40Ba’asyir did not actually go alone; he fled together with the late 
Abdullah Sungkar to Malaysia. See: Saiful Umam, “Radical Muslims in 
Indonesia: The Case of Ja’far Umar Thalib and The Laskar Jihad”, in Exploration 
in South East Asian Studied, vol 6, no. 1 spring 2006, p. 9. 
41Taufik Adnan Amal, Politik Syari’at Islam, p. 81. 
42Saiful Umam, Radical Muslims in Indonesia, p. 11-12. 
43S. Yunanto, Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and South East Asia 
(Jakarta: Ridep Institute-FES, 2003), p. 37. 
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salafism, including those still popular in Saudi Arabia. One such 
emphasis is the firm belief that the United States and Israel are 
leading a world-wide conspiracy to destroy Islam and the 
response by Muslims to this effort must be armed jihad.44 
In this regard, Ja’far accused the United States, Israel, and 
Christians in general of masterminding the religious violence in 
Ambon. He speculated that the Maluku islands are ‘a pilot 
project’ of the Christianisation of Indonesia, which is organized 
by the Zionist-Christian International conspiracy.45 
Two years after establishing the FKAWJ, Thalib declared a 
Laskar Jihad on 30 January 2000 at the Kridosono Stadium 
Yogyakarta, DIY. The main purpose of this Laskar was to recruit, 
train, and deploy Islamic paramilitaries in Ambon to help and 
protect their Muslim brothers from Laskar Kristus attacks.46 Laskar 
Jihad was a paramilitary wing of FKAWJ formed to respond to 
the religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Maluku. 
When the ICG reported the massacring of over 400 Muslims by 
Christans at Tobelo in North Maluku during the last week of 
December 1999, the large number of victims inflamed emotions of 
Muslims throughout Indonesia.47 
On 6 April 2000 six representatives of Laskar Jihad met 
with President Abdurrahman Wahid at the Merdeka palace. They 
conveyed their harsh criticism to Gus Dur concerning the Maluku 
conflict, the idea of revoking TAP MPRS 25/1996, and the plans 
to start a diplomatic cooperation with Israel. While Gus Dur 
talked with the six representatives, hundreds of Laskar Jihad 
members demonstrated in front of the Merdeka palace. Although 
the government asked them to leave Java, they traveled with ease 
                                                        
44Robert W. Hefner, Civil Pluralism Denied? The New Media and Jihadi 
Violence in Indonesia (nc.: np., 2002), p. 6. 
45Ja’far Umar Thalib, “Jihad fi sabilillah: Solusi Problematika Bangsa dan 
Negara Indonesia”, in Salafy, no. 34, 2000, p. 33. 
46Laskar Kristus came from the Petra church and held a sacred mission to 
fight Muslims under the banner of Christianity. It was lead by Agus Wattimena 
who claimed his organization had 20.000 members in Ambon. See Lindsya 
Murdoch, “Revenge Fuels Cycle of Religious Violence”, in The Age Saturday, 27 
Jan. 2000. 
47-, “Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku”, in International Crisis 
Group, Asia Report, no. 31, 8 February 2002, p. 5. 
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to Ambon. There were approximately 3000 jihadists sent to 
Ambon.48 They traveled to Maluku by ship from Surabaya port in 
East Java. Their arrival at Maluku port was welcomed by military 
troops who provided weapons for them such as AK-47s and SS-
14s. There have been persistent allegations that Laskar Jihad’s 
operation was supported by the ‘green TNI’ faction. Hefner wrote 
that in January 2000 Ja’far was approached by the military with 
the message that they approved of his plans to escalate the armed 
campaign against the Christians in Maluku.49  
Apart from military involvement, this group was clearly 
part of a transnational network (Wahabi Salafism). Before fighting 
against Christians in Maluku, Laskar Jihad had received fatwas 
(religious decrees) from seven muftis (religious authorities) in 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. These muftis were Abd al-Razzaq ibn 
Abd al-Muhsin al-Abbad, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi’i, Rabi’ ibn 
Hadi al-Madkhali, salih al-Suhaymi, Ahmad Yahya ibn 
Muhammad al-Najm, Wahid al-Jabiri, and Zaid ibn Muhammad 
ibn Hadi al-Madkhali.50 
Ja’far Umar Thalib himself was of Madurese-Arab 
descent. He studied at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, 
with funding from DDII (Indonesian Islamic Propagation 
Council). However, he did not finish his education there due to a 
disagreement with his lecturer. In 1987 he decided to fight in the 
Afghanistan war under the financial aegis of the Ra>bit}ah al-‘A{lam 
al-Isla>my (Muslim World League). His broad experiences and 
ability to mobilize forces and pioneer groups made Laskar Jihad 
grow in popularity, and soon they claimed to have around 10.000 
                                                        
48Taufik Adnan Amal, Politik Syari’at Islam, p. 73. 
49Robert W. Hefner, “Global Violence and Indonesian Muslim Politics”,  in 
American Anthropologist, vol. 104, no. 3, September 2002, p. 762. 
50In this fatwa the hatred of Christians was visible because the requester 
had explained to the muftis that the Maluku conflict had turned into a massacre 
by Christian of Muslims, therefore it is not surprising that al-Wadi’i asked all 
Indonesian Muslims to rise up and conduct jihad in the name of Allah and 
conquer the Christians who occupy Muslim territory. See  Noorhaidi Hasan, The 
radical Muslim Discourse on Jihad and the Head of Christians, paper presented in the 
International Symposium on Christianity in Indonesia, Perspective of Power, 
held in the University of Frankfurt, Germany, from 12-14 December 2003, p. 9. 
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members.51 However, four days after the Bali bombing, 12 
October 2002, he disbanded this group, not including FKAWJ. 
Although formally FKAWJ is an umbrella organization 
for Laskar Jihad, the latter is more popular among the Indonesian 
people, because during the Maluku conflict it had widely 
reported its daily activities and photos of the massacre in Maluku 
through various publications such as websites, bulletins including 
Maluku Hari Ini and Berita Laskar, a sermon cassette and CD titled 
‘Tasjilate Ihya Sunnah’ which contained lectures and sermons from 
Ja’far Umar Thalib and his fellow preachers Muhammad as 
Sewed, Usamah Mahri, and Dzul Akmal.52 
The FPI (Front of Islamic Defenders), widely conceived to 
be a ‘rent jihad’ rather than a genuine Islamic movement, was 
established on 17 August 1998 by Misbahul Alam (a NU-trained 
cleric) and Habib Rizieq Syihab (an Arabic extradite). Originally, 
its goal was to become a nationwide support base for the PPP, but 
it was later redefined as a street-level ‘anti-vice’ movement.53 Like 
the Laskar Jihad, FPI has a close relationship with the military 
and political elites. 
This hardliner group began to be widely known in 
Indonesian society because of its engagement on the national 
political stage. Initially, this group served as PAM Swakarsa 
(voluntary security forces), attacking student movements who 
refused to reelect President B.J. Habibie in the Sidang Istimewa 
MPR on November 1998. Furthermore, FPI appears to have close 
relationships with the military and political elites. It was initially 
entwined with Prabowo Subianto, a son in law of Soeharto. Yet 
when Prabowo fell, the FPI approached General Wiranto.54 The 
close relationship between the FPI and Wiranto can be analysed 
from their ransacking the office of Komnas HAM (National 
Human Right Commission) on 23 June 2000.55  
                                                        
51S. Yunanto, Militant Islamic Movements, p. 43. 
52S. Yunanto, Militant Islamic Movements, p. 41. 
53Ian Douglas Wilson, “Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours 
of Organized Violence in Post New Order Indonesia”, in Critical Asian Studies, 
vol. 38, 2 June 2006, p. 282-286. 
54Robert W. Hefner, Globalization, p. 14-15. 
55-, “Front Dan Brigade Jadi Hakim”, in Gatra, 31 July 2000. 
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After Wiranto retired, FPI lost its patron and began 
shifting their attention to anti-America issues, establishing the 
shari’a, and against deviant religious sects. The FPI has assisted 
PPP and PBB, especially in terms of mobilizing proponents and 
campaigning for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter during the 
2001 and 2002 ST MPR.56 Dealing with the anti-U.S. campaign, the 
FPI organised demonstrations of over 10.000 people in Jakarta to 
protest against the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (October 2001), 
and led large demonstrations against the U.S. war in Iraq. During 
a demonstration, Rizieq, the leader of the FPI, menacingly stated 
in front of the U.S. Embassy; ‘I consider the attack on Iraq an 
attack on Islam.’ This statement further ensured his existence in 
the political limelight.57 
Where Ja’far Umar Thalib is of Madurese-Arab Descent, 
Habib Rizieq Syihab is of Batavian-Arab descent. He studied 
Islam at the University of King Saud in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The 
FPI also has a paramilitary wing called Komandan Laskar Pembela 
Islam (KLI, Islam Troop Command) which aims to accelerate the 
realisation of the organisation’s goal. The most visible action of 
the KLI was the ‘Monas Tragedy.’ On 1 June 2008 hundreds of 
KLI paramilitaries suddenly attacked the AKKBB who were 
advocating for the rights of Ahmadiyah at Monas, Jakarta.58 
Ironically, there was not a single security apparatus that 
prevented the action or even operated in that location. In fact the 
incident took place near the Presidential Palace. KLI claimed that 
their action was legitimized by the decree of Bakorpakem (the 
Coordination Board for the Monitoring of Non-Institutionalized 
Religious Groups) which decided that the Ahmadiyah sect is a 
banned organisation.59  
                                                        
56Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia and 9-11: Reaction and Implications”, in Han 
Sung-Joo (et.al.), Coping with 9-1: Asia Perspectives on Global and Regional Order, 
(Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2003), p. 64. 
57-, “Indonesia Stage Mass Prayer against War in Iraq”, in Reuters, 10 
March 2003. 
58The video or recorded event can be seen at http://tv.kompas.com, 
accessed 14 December 2008. 
59An audio visual account of this event can be seen at: 
http://www.youtube.com, accessed 14 December 2008. 
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G. Conclution 
The rise of Muslim politics in the post-Soeharto era is not 
surprising. For around 32 years, political Islam was repressively 
marginalised by the authoritarian regime. Nowadays, the 
political system has shifted from authoritarian to democratic in 
Indonesia. Many Islamic political groups have emerged since 
the 1998 Reformation, either political parties or radical Islamic 
groups. 
During the ST MPR in 2000 and 2001, they formally 
proposed the (re)inclusion of the Jakarta Charter via PPP and 
PBB, but again they failed. Compared to the 1955 elections, they 
even decreased in the 1999 and 2004 elections. In the 1955 
general elections, the supporters of the Jakarta Charter won 
forty percent of the seats. In 1999 they only won twelve percent, 
a decline of 28 percent.  Following the recent 2004 general 
elections, PPP won 8.05 percent of the votes and PBB only won 
2.62 percent of the ballot. In other words, the Islamic parties 
together have 10.65 percent, a slight decline from twelve per 
cent in 1999. 
It indicates that the politik aliran is somewhat blurred 
today. Fifty years ago the santri groups were comparatively 
solid in their support for the Jakarta Charter, yet after the 
Reformation era they are fragmented, and some even rejected 
the shari’a agenda, like the NU and the Muhammadiyah, 
associated to PKB and PAN respectively. This is a remarkable 
difference from the past political landscape. However, along 
with this change, Islamic radicalism also rapidly proliferated in 
this country. Although their numbers are lower than moderate 
Muslims groups, their political movement is more vocal and 
often gains public attention in the press. 
Next, the radical Islamic groups can be divided into two 
categories, the conservatives and the neo-conservatives. The first 
group rejects Pancasila and insists on reinserting the Jakarta 
Charter into the constitution (Darul Islam, Komando Jihad, and 
the MMI). The second group also calls for the formalization of 
shari’a but allow Pancasila as a state ideology (Laskar Jihad, the 
FPI, and KPPSI). Seemingly, they gradually change their 
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strategy (from bottom up) in striving for Islamic ideology but it 
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